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Using the currency demand approach size and development of the Colombian shadow eco-
nomy are estimated over the period from 1976 to 2002. In the 70s the size fluctuated around 
20% of official GDP and rose to 50% in the 90s. The most important factors driving the sha-
dow economy are unemployment and taxation. Analyzing the interaction between shadow 
and official economy, the shadow economy has a positive effect on the official one. Average 
growth rate of real per capita GDP is 1.11% between 1976 and 2002 and the shadow eco-
nomy “explains” on average between 0.09 and 0.27 of this growth. 
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1.  Introduction 
Colombia is a developing country which unfortunately made the headlines in the media 
because of her drug crime business which negatively influenced Colombia’s image by 
her large-scale cocain production and trade especially since the 80s. Our paper, 
however, does not deal with drug trafficking or other illegal (i.e. classical crime) 
economic activities in Colombia, because the focus of our study is the estimation of the 
size and the development of the shadow economy over time and its influence on the 
“official” economic growth of Colombia. To our knowledge these two aspects have not 
been investigated so far, especially the interaction of the shadow economy with the 
official one and here the question whether the shadow economy has a positive or 
negative effect! 
 
Our paper is divided in five parts. After this short introduction, in part 2 some theoretical 
considerations about this topic are given, explaining different ways of defining a 
shadow economy, analyzing the main causes that support underground activity and 
discussing interactions between formal (official) and informal (shadow) economy. In 
part 3, the econometric results of regression models based on the currency-demand 
approach (to calculate the size of the shadow economy in Colombia) are presented. 
Based on these results, in part 4 econometric estimations are shown which 
demonstrate the influence of the shadow economy on the official one, here on “official” 
economic growth. In part 5, the study concludes with a summary of the main findings 
and a brief outlook on possible policies to tackle the problem of underground activities. 
 
 
2.  Theoretical background 
 
2.1.  Defining the shadow economy 
Researchers attempting to estimate the size of shadow economy face the problem of 
defining a shadow economy. One commonly used (working) definition is: All currently 
unregistered economic activities are counted that contribute to the officially calculated 
(or observed) Gross National Product.
1 Smith (1994, p. 18) uses the definition “market-
based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes detection 
in the official estimates of GDP.” One of the broadest definitions includes “those 
economic activities and the income derived from them that circumvent or other wise 
                                            
1 This definition is used, for example, by Feige (1989, 1994), Schneider (1994a, 2003b, 2005), and 
Frey and Pommerehne (1984). Do-it-yourself activities are not included.     page 3 out of 39 
government regulation, taxation or observation”.
2 As these just mentioned definitions 
still leave open a lot of questions, Table 2.1 summarizes what could be a reasonable 
consensus about the definition of the underground (or shadow) economy. From Table 
2.1, it is clear that a broad definition of the shadow economy includes unreported 
income from the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter 
transactions – and so includes all economic activities that would generally be taxable 
were they reported to the tax authorities. 
 
Table 2.1:  A taxonomy of types of underground economic activities 
monetary transactions  non-monetary transactions 
illegal activities 
y  trade with stolen goods 






y  barter of drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling, etc. 
y  producing or growing drugs for own 
use 
y  theft for own use 
legal activities 
tax evasion  tax avoidance  tax evasion  tax avoidance 
y unreported  in-
come from self-
employment 




work related to 
legal services 
and goods 
y employee  dis-
counts, fringe 
benefits 
y  barter of legal 
services and 
goods 




Source: Structure of the table is taken from Lippert and Walker (1997, p. 5) with additional own 
remarks. 
 
Our paper uses a more narrow definition of the shadow economy
3: The shadow 
economy includes all market-based legal production of goods and services that are 
deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: 
 
(1)  tax evasion or tax avoidance, 
(2)  to avoid payment of social security contributions, 
(3)  to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum 
wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and/or 
                                            
2 This definition is taken from Del’Anno (2003), Del’Anno and Schneider (2004) and Feige (1989). See 
also Thomas (1999) and Fleming et al. (2000). 
3 Compare also the excellent discussion of the definition of the shadow economy in Pedersen (2003, 
pp. 13-19), who uses a similar definition.     page 4 out of 39 
(4)  to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing 
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
 
Hence, this paper does not deal with typical economic activities that are illegal and fit 
the characteristics of classical crimes like burglary, robbery, drug dealing, etc. The 
definition used also excludes all non-market based economic activities like neighbour 
help, household and do-it-yourself work. 
 
2.2.  Theoretical considerations about the main causes for the existence of the sha-
dow economy 
 
(1) Tax and social security burdens 
Numerous studies demonstrate, that an increasing burden of taxes and social security 
contributions is one of the main causes for the development and increase of shadow 
economic activities.
4 The reason is that this form of fiscal intervention has a strong 
influence on individuals’ cost-benefit and/or labour-leisure choices because it heavily 
increases the opportunity cost for legal economic activities and finally reduces the 
profitability of legal (official) work. The greater the difference between total cost of 
labour in the official economy and after-tax earnings from work, the greater is the 
incentive to work in the shadow economy. However, even major tax reforms with major 
tax rate deductions may not lead to a substancial decrease of the shadow economy.
5 
Such reforms may stabilize the size of the shadow economy and avoid a further 
increase. Social networks and personal relationships, high profits form irregular 
activities, and associated investments in real and human capital prevent people from 
going back to the official economy.
6 
 
Figure. 2.1:  Main causes for the increase of shadow economic activities. 
                                            
4 See Enste in Bajada/ Schneider (2005), Schneider (2005, 2006), Alm (1996) 
5 See Schneider (1994b, 1998b) for a similar result of the effects of a major tax reform in Austria on 
the shadow economy. 
6 For Canada, Spiro (1993) found such reactions of people facing an increase in indirect taxes (VAT, 
GST).     page 5 out of 39 
 
Source: Schneider (2006). 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the great importance of tax and social security contribution 
burdens on the size and the development of the shadow economy. Further empirical 
studies of the influence of the tax burden on the shadow economy by Schneider 
(1994b, 2000) and Johnson et al. (1998a,b) also show statistically significant evidence 
for the influence of taxation on the shadow economy. A strong influence of indirect and 
direct taxation on the shadow economy is additionally demonstrated by empirical 
results for Austria and Scandinavian countries from Schneider (2005). 
 
(2) Intensity of regulation 
The original objectives of regulations were to avoid market failures, hence the goal was 
to increase welfare, reducing external effects and redistribution of wealth for higher 
justice within the population. Labour market regulation mostly for employees’ and 
workers’ protection mainly show, at least in the long term, positive effects. However, 
regulations also lead to the fact that people often consider such interventions of the 
government as a limitation of their personal freedom. In addition, fullfilling laws normally 
causes supplementary cost and may therefore have a negative influence on production 
possibilities and competitivity of individuals and firms. A higher scope of regulation 
leads in most cases to higher bureaucratic expenditures for individuals and firms as 
well as for public authorities (Schneider (2000)) and may be a “hotbed” for corruption, 
particularly in developing countries. To sum up, individuals often consider increasing 
intensity of state regulation as cost-rising and freedom-limiting. Therefore, increasing 
intensity of regulation supports the switch to shadow economic activities. These 
theoretical considerations are supported by empirical studies, which show, that 
increasing intensity of regulation leads to a growing shadow economy.
7 At this point it is 
should be mentioned, that a higher possibility of detection and/or higher expected 
                                            
7 Compare Schneider (2005), Wagner (1984), Enste (2005) and especially the survey of Schneider 
and Enste (2002).     page 6 out of 39 
punishment also influence the growth of the shadow economy negatively (Wagner 
(1984)).  
 
(3) Changes in labour market conditions and the employment system 
A rationing (i.e. strong policy intervention) on the official labour market, e.g. reduction of 
maximum working hours per week, or a decrease of the age for retirement have the 
effect that people have available much more time which can be used for shadow 
economic activities. Another argument could be that after such changes people find 
themselves confronted with circumstances where their desired total working time no 
longer corresponds to their actual one, so that they have a strong incentive to engage 
in shadow economic activities. An economic crisis may also lead to a reduction of the 
work force needed in the official labour market; hence it is common that during 
recessions the official demand for labour decreases and unemployment rises. Thus, it 
is not surprising that during the worldwide recession in the 70s a general increase in 
the extent of shadow economic activity was observed (Gijsel (1984)). 
 
An increase in transfers (e.g. unemployment benefits, pensions, etc.) reduces the 
incentives to work in the official economy, too. As a consequence, people choose to 
work less in the official economy and as a result may increase their shadow economic 
activities. 
 
Another incentive for working in the shadow economy is a rise in the wage rate in the 
informal sector (e.g. caused by higher demand for illicit work) as this increases the 
rentability of illicit work relative to employment in the official sector. In a similar way, a 
reduction in the net wage rate in the official economy (e.g. due to an increase in payroll 
tax) decreases the rentability of work in the official economy or the marginal utility of the 
extension of official working time which may also lead to an increase of shadow 
economic activity. However, this argumentation is only valid for considerations on a 
microeconomic basis. According to macroeconomic theory, lower wages lead to higher 
employment as demand for labour increases and lower unemployment implicates, 
ceteris paribus, lower activity in the shadow economy.
8 
 
(4) Changes in individual values and general attitude towards shadow economic activity 
In all „civilized“ societies politicians interfere in the economy in order to “fix” the limits 
between legality and illegality and to regulate the functioning of economic life. These 
interventions, however, may not be according to everybodies’ idea of morality and 
                                            
8 Schneider/ Enste (2002), Wagner (1984), Enste (2005) and Kirchgässner (2006).     page 7 out of 39 
understanding of justice (Besozzi (2001)). This means that people have no bad feelings 
towards „normal“ shadow economic activities; people often may find it easy to justify 
their unofficial supply or demand for goods and services because friends and family 
members just “do the same” (Schneider (2000, p.8)). 
 
The term „changes in individual values“ generally consists of all possible changes in 
morality of a certain group or a whole country’s population relating to their willingness to 
accept state regulations. They may also change their view of the competence of public 
authorities, tax morale and the common attitude towards shadow economic activities. In 
general, if trust of the public authorities is high handling their affairs and if the 
population shows a positive attitude towards fiscal interventions, one normally expects 
lower shadow economic activities (Haslinger (1984) and Kirchgässner (2006)). For 
instance a change in individual values may happen, when taxpayers suddenly believe 
that they no longer receive adequate social services or benefits for the revenues paid to 
the government. Another example is the increase in overall tax burdens which is not 
accompanied by immediate and visible increases in (social) state services. Such events 
lower the acceptance and the trust in public authorities and increase the incentive to 
engage in the shadow economy, partly because in such situations people may feel the 




2.3.  Theoretical reasoning about the interaction between official and inofficial eco-
nomies  
Obviously there are many interactions between the official and inofficial (shadow) 
economies in a country, hence a strict separation of these two parts of the economy is 
not possible.
10 Therefore it is not surprising that there is a continuous interaction 
between official and unofficial economy. Naylor (1996) emphasizes that the official part 
of the economy could never work efficiently if it were totally separated from the 
unofficial part. A study carried out by the OECD confirms further, that the shadow 
economy permanently competes with the official economy, on the other hand Lubell 
(1991) states that the formal and informal economies also complement each other. 
Other studies (Lubell (1991), Besozzi (2001) and Schneider (2005)) show, that a 
certain influence of the shadow economy on the efficient functioning and development 
of the official economy can not be denied. 
 
                                            
9 Schneider (2000) and Gretschmann (1984). 
10 Compare Besozzi (2001), Naylor (1996) cited in Besozzi (2001, p.12), Lubell (1991) and Schneider 
(2005).     page 8 out of 39 
One of the shadow economy’s main influences is the one on the tax sytem. As a 
consequence, redistribution policies based on tax revenues and the overall financing of 
the public sector are affected. For instance, one hypothesis is that a reduction in the 
size of the shadow economy leads to higher tax revenues, if and only if this leads to an 
increase in economic activities in the official sector, which happens only to a very 
limited extent. These additional resources can then be invested in a qualitative and 
quantitative improvement of public goods and services which in turn induces economic 
growth (Schneider (2005)). On the other hand, Schneider (2005) argues that shadow 
economic activity even generates additional tax revenues if these shadow activities are 
complementary to the official economy and if the earned extra income is spent in the 
official economy for goods and services.  
 
Frey (1989) mentions that especially in developing countries parts of the raw materials 
and semi-produced goods used in the official economy originate from shadow 
economic sources. Particularly in developing countries, the actors of the informal 
economy established themselves as important customers, suppliers and business 
partners of firms working in the official economy (Besozzi (2001)). This again 
underlines the strong interdependence between formal and informal economy (Witte 
(1996) and Lubell (1991)). 
 
Applying the allocation theory, the shadow economy has positive effects on the overall 
functioning of an economy: more efficient use of scarce resources, stimulation of 
markets and competition, incentives for firms and individuals, enlargement of market 
supply with additional goods and services, generation of additional income, more 
creativity and more innovation, etc. However, the allocation effects of the shadow 
economy are not exclusively positive. Unfair ruineous competition due to cost 
advantages of suppliers in the informal economy may cause official suppliers to be 
pushed out of the market as they are no longer competitive. In addition, a lack of 
transparency and a lacking structure of the inoffical sector may lead to problems in 
information flows and consequently will lead to a higher intransparency of the markets 
which means that conditions for both, suppliers and consumers, become harder for 
efficient comparisons of quality and prices. On the other hand, unofficial suppliers often 
work under perfect competition, so that the condition of setting prices equal to marginal 
cost holds. Higher competition creates incentives, which lead to more efficient resource 
allocation on both sides, the official and the shadow economy (Schneider (2003a)). 
     page 9 out of 39 
Another problem caused by the shadow economy is the bias in the officially published 
data of economic figures which are used for economic policy decisions, too. As the 
informal part of the economy does not appear in official statistics, it can only be taken 
into consideration with rough approximations or in the extreme case, not at all. Hence, 
all stabilizing, redistributional and fiscal policies are based on inaccurate or even false 
indicators. A study by Feige and McGee (1989) shows, for instance, that traditional 
anticyclical monetary and fiscal policy measures do not have the desired stabilizing but 
destabilizing effects if shadow economic activity is not taken into consideration. McGee 
(1989) describes a very impressive model in which monetary policy, aiming at full 
employment and only based on indicators of the official economy, disregarding the 
shadow economy, does not lead to the required positive labour market effects but 
causes stagflation.  
 
Whether economic efficiency or justice should be the primary interest for politics is a 
controversial issue, however, governments usually implement redistribution policies to 
some extent, where efficiency is strongly influenced by the shadow economy. As the 
size of the informal sector can only be estimated and also the individuals acting in the 
underground can not be identified precisely, it is possible that those benefiting from 
public services and allowances intended to support the underprivileged part of the 
population identified by official statistics, are not the real “needy”. The easier it is for 
individuals to cheat and the more are doing it, the higher are the official expenditures in 
these categories leading to an even higher light budget situation. This either leads to 
an increase in overall taxation, or to a reduction in social services and allowances. 
Regardless of how a government finances this discrepancy, there will always be many 
citizens feeling cheated (those who are forced to pay more and more taxes, those who 
receive too little social benefits despite their neediness, etc.). This may easily end in a 
vicious circle, as individuals, who feel unfairly treated rapidly begin establishing 
“justice” themselves, doing their own redistribution policies by migrating into the 
shadow economy which causes the official redistribution policies to fail their objectives 
even more (Schneider and Enste (2002)). In this respect, Fleming, Roman and Farrell 
(2000) claim that the size of the shadow economy may even serve as an indicator of 
how efficient or inefficient political strategies are, as inappropriate policies are 
incentives for individuals to begin acting in the underground. 
 
Various studies (e.g. Schneider (2005 and 2006)) demonstrate the interaction between 
the official and the shadow economy, still, but their results are discussed 
controversially, especially, whether positive effects predominant negative ones or vice     page 10 out of 39 
versa. As these effects among others always depend on the concrete size of the 
shadow economy, the intensity of interaction between formal and informal sector and 
the specific economic situation of a country, an answer can only be given after an 
empirical analysis is undertaken for concrete countries, which we will do for the case of 
a developing country, namely Colombia. 
 
     page 11 out of 39 
3.  Empirical estimates of the size of the shadow economy in Colombia 
 
3.1.  Estimation method and variables 
One possibility to estimate the size and development of the shadow economy is to use 
the currency demand approach
11. We have chosen this approach for Colombia and 
have applied two variations of the currency demand model, which also have been 
estimated: The first uses as dependent variable, the ratio of cash holdings to checkable 
deposits (CD), the second uses as dependent variable, currency demand per capita 
(CDC). Using these two different specifications of the dependent variable, robustness 
and reliability of the estimation results can be examined. The independent variables 
used to explain the official currency demand are: 
 
(1) the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (GDPPC),  
(2) the yearly average interest rate on deposits of 90 days (IRD),   
(3) the cumulative real value of imported cash dispensers (depreciations of 20 % per 
year deducted) as a proxy variable for cash substitutes describing changes in cash 
demand over time (ICD).  
 
The variables included in the model for explaining the currency demand induced by 
shadow economic activities are 
(4) the average real direct (TY) and indirect (TC) net tax rates (tax on income and 
VAT),  
(5) the unemployment rate (UNEMP), and  
(6) the real expenditures for public employees in % of GDP (as a proxy for the intensity 
of regulation and control) (EPE).
12 
 
Estimation equation for model 1 based on the ratio of cash holdings to checkable 
deposits: 
t t
t t t t t t t
u EPE
UNEMP TC TY ICD IRD GDPPC CD
+ × +
× + × + × + × + × + × + =
7
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln
β
β β β β β β β
 
Estimation equation for model 2 based on currency demand per capita: 
t t t
t t t t t t
u EPE UNEMP
TC TY ICD IRD GDPPC CDC
+ × + ×
+ × + × + × + × + × + =
7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0 ln ln ln ln
β β
β β β β β β
 
 
                                            
11 For a detailed description and criticism on the currency-demand method see appendix A. 
12 For a detailed description of the variables used see appendix B., Table 1.1. 
(1)
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Based on monetary theory, the real GDP per capita is expected to have a positive 
effect on the dependent variable in both equations, whereas the interest rate should 
have a negative impact. Also the proxy variable for cash substitutes should influence 
the dependent variables positively, as it facilitates withdrawals. From the above 
theoretical considerations on the factors influencing the size and development of 
shadow economic activity, the coefficients of direct and indirect taxation, the 
unemployment rate and the proxy variable for the intensity of regulation are expected 
to have positive signs. To summarize, for both equations we derive for the independent 
variables the following signs: 
0 , , , 0 , 0 , 0 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 > > < > β β β β β β β and  
 
3.2. Estimation  results 
Table 3.1 shows the regression results for the two estimations based on the currency 
demand method. The detailed results including all statistics are shown in Appendix B, 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2. According to the theoretical considerations, one of the most 
important causes for shadow economic activity is the (total) tax burden, but the two tax 
variables included in the currency demand equations are not statistically significant at a 
5 % level
13 - with the exception of the indirect tax burden (TC) in model 1. One reason 
for this may be multicolinearity between the two tax variables and in order to avoid this, 
we also tried an overall tax burden (direct and indirect tax burden), which showed up 
statistically significant in both equations. In our regressions we use yearly data for the 
period from 1976 to 2002. For model 2, we use the natural logarithm of currency 
demand per capita; in both variants of model 2, an ARIMA model has been specified to 
correct for first order autocorrelation. For model 1, a standard OLS regression has 
been run for the original model (var. 1a with both tax variables included) as well as for 
the variation (var. 1b with only one total tax variable) as test statistics here do not 
indicate time series problems. 
 
                                            
13 In this paper we follow the usual procedure to declare coefficients as “statistically significant”, if their 
statistical significance is given on a 5 % or better significance level.     page 13 out of 39 
Table. 3.1: Regression results using the currency demand method. 
 
regression results 
  model 1  model 2 
endogenous variables  ratio cash holdings to 
checkable deposits 
currency demand per 
capita (ln) 
estim. coefficients  estim. coefficients 
exogenous variables 
Var. 1a  Var. 1b  Var. 2a  Var.  2b 
GDPPC:   real GDP per capita (ln)  0.2590352 0.3618224* 5.298498* 5.33385*
IRD:   interest rate on bank 
deposits (yearly 
average) 
-0.1580274 -0.1909795 -0.544635 -  0.5517756
ICD:   cumulative value of 
cash dispensers (ln) 
-0.0021550 -0.0106367 0.008891 0.008133
TY:   average net tax rate on 
income 
0.5357451 2.356146 
TC:   average net tax rate on 
consumption 
2.3821260* 3.080567 
T  overall taxation on 
income and 
consumption (ty+tc) 
1.195981*  2.608898  (*)
UNEMP:   unemployment rate  2.7227350* 2.432499* 5.130958* 5.172192*
EPE:   real expenditures for 
public employees (% of 
real GDP) 
-0.0370014 0.4260926 -2.597696 -2.713188
constant term  3.8371500 -5.246178* -67.401480* -67.8917*
* significant on 5 % level (*) significant on the 10% level 
 
Source:  Own calculations. For more detailed tables of the regression results see appendix B.2. 
 
The coefficients of the independent variables of both regression models show the 
theoretically expected signs. Only the sign of the proxy variable for cash substitutes 
(ICD) is ambiguous, but considering that it is not statistically significant in none of the 
four estimations, this is not too worrying.
14 It may be that this variable is not a good 
proxy for explaining changes in currency demand via cash substitutes. Another 
explanation could be that the increasing availability of cash dispensers generally has an 
ambivalent influence on currency demand: A higher number of cash dispensers may 
contribute to the attractiveness of using plastic money (higher circulation of credit and 
debit cards), while they simultaneously increase currency demand making withdrawals 
considerably more convenient. Hence, it is highly likely that the effects cancel out each 
other. 
 
Regarding the other independent variables explaining the currency demand, real GDP 
per capita (GDPPC) has a statistically significant and quantitatively large influence on 
the dependent variable in all models. If real GDP per capita rises by 1 %, the ratio of 
cash holdings to checkable deposits increases by 0.003 and 0.004 in estimation 1a and 
1b respectively and the currency demand per capita increases by 5.3 %, ceteris 
                                            
14 Also the low beta-coefficients of the variable underline that it is relatively unimportant (see appendix 
B.2).     page 14 out of 39 
paribus. Standardized beta-coefficients also show the important impact of GDP per 
capita on the endogenous variables, particularly in model 2a, where the beta-coefficient 
for real GDP per capita is 0.38 which is by far the greatest value compared to the beta-
coefficients of the other variables. The coefficient on the average interest rate on bank 
deposits (IRD) has a negative sign in all regressions presented, which indicates the 
expected decrease in cash holdings with rising interest rates. However, the coefficient 
is not statistically significant (p-values between 0.24 and 0.38) in all four equations. 
 
The variables explaining currency demand induced by shadow economic activities 
(direct and indirect tax rates: TY, TC and unemployment rate: UNEMP) also show the 
expected signs: The positive relation between rising unemployment, as well as 
increasing direct and indirect tax rates and the dependent variables are in line with our 
hypothesis that these factors support the growth of underground activities and hence 
have a positive impact on currency demand. Personnel cost for public sector 
employees (EPE) as a proxy variable for the intensity of regulation and control shows a 
negative effect on currency demand in three of the four regressions presented. 
According to our theoretical argumentation this is the wrong sign for this variable, as 
higher intervention in the market should increase the size of the shadow economy and 
consequently the demand for cash. One explanation for the negative relation detected 
could be that higher personnel cost were due to a widening of the staff in the executive 
areas which means higher possibility of detection of informal activities and therefore a 
decrease in the attractiveness of illicit work and other underground activities. However, 
as this variable is not statistically significant in both models and their variants, a 
detailed interpretation of this variable is not necessary. 
 
With respect to the statistical significance of the independent variable unemployment 
rate (UNEMP), this variable is highly statistically significant in all models and also has a 
great quantitative effect on the endogenous variables. This can be shown by a 
comparison of the regression coefficients as well as by the standardized beta-
coefficients. In our regression results, a rise in the unemployment rate by one 
percentage point increases the ratio of cash holdings to checkable deposits by 0.027 
and 0.024 for variant 1a and 1b respectively and money per capita in circulation by 0.05 
%, ceteris paribus. 
 
The tax variables, which are considered as one of the main causes for shadow 
economic activities, have an important effect on the demand for money: An increase by 
one percentage point of the indirect average net tax rate (TC), whose statistical     page 15 out of 39 
significance is satisfactory in both of the main equations, increases the ratio of cash 
holdings to checkable deposits by 0.02 and the currency demand per capita by 0.038 
%, ceteris paribus. The direct average net tax rate (TY), too, has a great influence on 
demand for cash: If the average net tax rate on income rises by one percentage point, 
currency demand per capita increases by 0.023 % and the ratio of cash holdings to 
checkable deposits increases by 0.005. However, the impact of the tax rate on income 
is smaller than that of the tax rate on consumption and is not statistically significant. 
The reason for that may be that the tax variables are highly correlated (correlation 
coefficient (Cor[TY,TC] = 0.8145) and thus there might be a problem of multicolinearity. 
Nevertheless, standard F-tests show a high joint statistical significance of the tax 
variables. To avoid the problem of multicolinearity, a total tax burden variable is used 
and variations 1b and 2b of the main equation models have been estimated. The 
results show a large quantitative impact of overall taxation as well as statistical 
significance on a high level (p-values are 0.002 and 0.057 for variant 1b and 2b 
respectively). 
 
Further statistical tests show a high joint significance of the variables (TY, TC, UNEMP, 
EPE) used for describing demand for money induced by shadow economic activities in 
both models: The four variables are jointly statistically significant on a 15 % level and 




In the next step we undertake simulations, where the values of the variables used to 
explain the currency demand induced by shadow economic activities (TY, TC, UNEMP, 
EPE) were held on their lowest levels, in order to calculate the theoretical („official“) 
currency demand per capita. The difference between the real observed and the 
calculated theoretical demand for money gives the estimated currency demand per 
capita induced by shadow economic activities. These results multiplied by the velocity 
of money in the official economy provide value added figures of the estimated size of 
the shadow economy which can be shown as a percentage of GDP. 
 
The simulation results of the different models for the size of the shadow economy in 
Colombia lie relatively closely together, especially the simulations derived from the two 
regressions with only one cumulative tax variable (variants 1b and 2b). The results are 
presented in Figure 3.1 which also shows the robustness of the models presented in 
this paper. Even if the simulation results generally show higher divergences in earlier 
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years, the estimates present the same trend: The size of the shadow economy in 
Colombia increases rapidly until the mid 80s, followed by a slight decrease until the mid 
90s. From the mid 90s on, the size of the Colombian shadow economy experiences 
another drastic increase. Only at the end of the period under consideration this trend 
comes to an end and a new slight decrease can be noticed. 
 
Figure 3.1:  Four simulations of the estimated size of the shadow economy in % of nominal GDP 


































model 1 - var. A model 1 - var. B model 2 - var. A model 2 - var. B
 
Source: Model 1 – var. A and model 1 – var. B are based on the regression results of model 1, 
variants a and b respectively, using the ratio of cash holdings to checkable deposits as 
endogenous variables whereas model 2 – var. A and model 2 – var. B use the results of the 
second regression’s variants using currency demand per capita as endogenous variable. 
 
The trends in the development of the shadow economy in Colombia resulting from the 
above simulations correspond to the general expectations: The increase until 1985 can 
be explained by the generally poor “official” economic situation in the country during 
that period (decreasing growth rates of GDP, rapid increase of the unemployment rate). 
During that time, underground activity was the only possibility for many people to 
generate income, especially for those from the poorer part of the population. The 
following decrease in the size of the shadow economy reflects the beginning 
stabilization of the economic situation. The drastic increase in the shadow economy 
over the last decade (1992-2000) is plausible due to another slowdown in “official” 
economic growth beginning in the mid 90s; it resulted in the worst recession the country 
experienced in the last century in 1999. 
 
 
4.  The interaction of the shadow economy with the official one in Colombia 
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To estimate the influence of the shadow economy on the “official” one, a growth model 
has to be specified, explaining the growth of real “official” GDP per capita (GGDPPC) 
by the independent factors influencing economic growth given using general economic 
theory. The most important factors are: inflation rate [IR], domestic and foreign direct 
investments [DI, FDI], size of the population [POP], human capital, measured as 
average schooling years per capita [SPC], participation rate on labour market [LPA], 
public spending on consumption [PCGDP]) as well as the size of the shadow economy 
[SE]. Applying this we get the following regression equation: 
 
Regression model: 
t t t t t t
t t t t t
u SE PCGDP LPA SPC POP
FDI DI IR GGDPPC GGDPPC
+ × + × + × + × + × +
× + × + × + × + = −
9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 1 0
ln
ln ln ln ln
β β β β β
β β β β β
 
 
According to general economic growth theory, the expected signs of the regression 
coefficients of the independent variables are positive for the lagged endogenous 
variable (GGDPPC), domestic and foreign direct investments (DI, FDI), total population 
(POP), average schooling per capita (SPC) and the participation rate on the labour 
market (LPA), whereas the signs of the coefficients for inflation rate (IR) and 
government consumption (PCGDP) are negative. 
 
Equation (3) has been estimated using several variations of the independent variable 
shadow economy: The first one uses the simulations on the size of the shadow 
economy calculated from the regression results of the first model, variants 1a and 1b 
(variable: ratio of cash holdings to checkable deposits) and the second variation uses 
the estimations from model 2, variants 2a and 2b, based on the currency demand per 
capita. Therefore, in total, four regressions have been run to estimate the influence of 
the shadow economy on official economic growth. 
 
4.2. Econometric  results 
The results are shown in Table 4.1, detailed ones (including test-statistics) are 
presented in appendix B.3. The estimated coefficients, in general, show the expected 
signs. Capital investments and total population have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on economic growth which is in line with economic growth theory. 
Foreign direct investment, the participation rate on the labour market and average 
years of schooling per capita also influence growth positively, although they do not 
show high statistical significance in all model variations. The price level and 
governmental consumption spending have the expected negative effect on economic 
growth and are highly statistically significant in all cases. 
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Source: Own calculations. See appendix B.3 for a more detailed listing of the regression results. 
 
For the most interesting independent variable, the shadow economy, the regression 
results show a quantitatively substantial and statistically highly significant positive 
influence on GDP growth: An increase in the size of the shadow economy by one 
percentage point (measured in percent of GDP), leads to a rise of the growth rate of 
real GDP per capita by between 0.20 and 0.22 percentage points, ceteris paribus. The 
(standardized) beta-coefficients
16 also point out the relatively large influence of shadow 
economic activity on economic growth. As beta-coefficients allow for a direct 
comparison of the importance of the various estimated coefficients of the independent 
variables, we got the result that the shadow economy has a quantitatively larger effect 
on economic growth than investments, participation rate and the average educational 
level. 
 
4.3.  Simulations on the relative and absolute influence of the shadow economy on 
economic growth 
Finally, we empirically determine the relative and absolute influence of the shadow 
economy for each year of our investigation; i.e. from 1983 to 2002. Applying a dynamic 
simulation, the difference between the official and the theoretical growth of real GDP 
per capita (the theoretical growth rate is corrected for the influence of the shadow 
economy) can be calculated: Multiplying the yearly variation of the estimated size of the 
shadow economy with its regression coefficient provides the concrete influence of the 
                                            
16 See appendix B.3 for details.     page 20 out of 39 
shadow economy on GDP growth for each year in percentage points. Taking these 
values one can easily calculate the absolute effects of the informal economy on 
economic growth. The corresponding simulation results are shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1:  Absolute and relative influence of the shadow economy on economic growth (of real 




Source: Own calculations. 
 
While average values of the growth of real GDP per capita vary between -2.3 and 
+3.4  % or -19 and +24 USD two periods, the average values of the relative and     page 21 out of 39 
absolute influences on growth by shadow economic activity lie between -1.47 and 
+1.86 percentage points and -10 and +14 USD respectively, which again shows the 
substantial effect of underground activity on economic growth. Due to the slight 
decrease of the size of the shadow economy in the 80s, there is a predominately 
negative contribution of the informal economy on growth in this period which changes 
into a positive one at the beginning of the 90s. Especially in the years 1999 and 2000 
when the Colombian economy experienced its biggest recession of the 20
th century the 
positive contribution of the shadow economy on economic growth seems to be 
particularly important. These results clearly demonstrate that especially during an 
economic crisis, shadow economy contributed to (partly) equalize the negative growth 
rates. 
 
A simulation of the theoretical development of economic growth under exclusion of 
shadow economic effects makes it clear that the theoretical growth rates (except during 
the second half of the 80s) continuously lie below the officially recorded economic 
growth rates which include the influence of the shadow economy. The results are 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure..4.2.:  Comparison of officially registered yearly growth rates of real GDP per capita in 
Colombia and simulated theoretical growth rates excluding the effects of shadow 
economic activity on growth, 1984-2002. 
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To underline this substantial influence on “official” economic growth caused by the 
informal economy, another simulation has been carried out which compares the 
development of the officially registered real GDP per capita and a simulated theoretical 
development of the GDP per capita corrected for the influence of the shadow economy. 
The results are shown in Figure 4.3. The basis for this simulation is the officially 
registered real GDP per capita in 1983. For the calculation of the theoretical 
development of real GDP per capita for the years until 2002, yearly growth rates were 
corrected for the effects of the shadow economy. They again demonstrate the great 
impact of the shadow economy by which the officially registered GDP per capita is 
influenced. The difference between the theoretical and the officially registered value is 
biggest in the period 1999 to 2000 when the Colombian economy experienced its major 
crisis of the 20
th century. For the year 2000, the simulated real GDP per capita 
corrected for the effect of the shadow economy lies 37 USD below the officially 
registered one. 
 
Figure 4.3:  Comparison of the development of the officially registered real GDP per capita and 
the simulated real GDP per capita corrected for shadow economic influences, 
Colombia, 1984-2002. 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
To sum up, all variations of the different simulations illustrate a significant positive 
impact of the shadow economy on economic growth in Colombia. Furthermore, the 
simulations on the absolute and relative effects demonstrate that the shadow economy     page 23 out of 39 




5.  Summary and conclusion  
Applying the currency demand approach, the first major finding of our paper is the large 
size of the shadow economy in Colombia, over the period from 1976 to 2002. After a 
slight decrease in the second half of the 80s, shadow economic activities have 
increased again in the last years (1995 to 2002) so that the shadow economy presently 
has reached a level of more than 50 % of real “official” GDP in Colombia. Our empirical 
analysis of the main causes for underground activities shows that on the one side rising 
unemployment has a great effect on the growth of the shadow economy, and on the 
other side we find a considerable influence caused by increases of direct and indirect 
taxation.  
 
Our second major finding is the positive effect of the shadow economy on economic 
growth in Colombia. Our results demonstrate a clear positive relation between the size 
of the shadow economy and the growth rates of real GDP per capita: The average 
growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1977 and 2002 is 1.11 %, and an average 
between 0.07 and 0.27 percentage points of the growth is explained by shadow 
economic activities. The simulations also demonstrate that particularly during 
recessions, the shadow economy at least partly offsets the negative growth rates of the 
official economy. 
 
Considering these two major findings we draw the following two conclusions:  
(1) Even if our econometric estimates provide the clear result of a positive (i.e. 
stimulating) effect of the shadow economy on “official” economic growth, we are aware 
that there are still great latent potentials and productivities in the shadow economy 
which can not be (fully) used due to the generally low productivity of the shadow 
economic activities and restrictions on human and financial capital resources. This may 
be one of the reasons why Colombia keeps being classified as a developing country 
and why its economic standard is still relatively low compared to western industrialized 
OECD nations. Colombia’s government is aware about these lost potentials by not 
using these underground productivities and has already implemented various programs 
to integrate the shadow economy in the official economy. We think it is reasonable to 
follow this strategy to benefit more from the shadow economic potentials.
17 
                                            
17 For a further discussion of integration strategies see Tokman (2006) and Lubell (1991).     page 24 out of 39 
 
(2) Moreover, Colombia was one of the first countries, where the government actively 
began dealing with the problems and potentials of shadow economic activities. Already 
from the beginning of the 70s, Colombia’s government has not only implemented 
strategies to integrate the shadow economy but also programs were set up to aim at 
the reduction of shadow economic activities. Unfortunately, these programs have not 
been of great success, mainly due to a lack of a long-term strategy and too little 
coordination of different programs.
18 One suggestion for a better coordination of the 
various programs dealing with the shadow economy could be the so-called “two-pillar 
strategy” which is an all-embracing approach on a macroeconomic basis aiming at a 
slow-down or reduction in shadow economic activities.
19 
 
                                            
18 See for example O’Grady (2006) for a discussion of continuous drawbacks in taxation policy and 
Gracia/ Urdinola (2000) for a debate on changes in labour market regulations. 
19 For a detailed explanation of the two-pillar strategy consult Schneider/Enste (2002).     page 25 out of 39 
Appendix A: Currency demand approach 
The currency demand approach was first used by Cagan (1958), who considered the 
correlation between the demand of currency and tax pressure (as one cause of the shadow 
economy) for the United States over the period 1919-1955. Twenty years later, Gutmann 
(1977) used the same approach but without any statistical procedures. Cagan’s approach 
was further developed by Tanzi (1980, 1983), who econometrically estimated a currency 
demand function for the United States over the period 1929 to 1980 in order to calculate the 
size of the shadow economy. His approach assumes that shadow (or hidden) transactions 
are undertaken in the form of cash payments, so as to leave no observable traces for the 
authorities. An increase in the size of the shadow economy will therefore increase the 
demand for currency. To isolate the resulting excess demand for currency, an equation for 
currency demand is econometrically estimated over time. All conventional possible factors, 
such as the development of income, payment habits, interest rates, and so on, are controlled 
for. Additionally, such variables as the direct and indirect tax burden and government 
regulation, which are assumed to be the major factors causing people to work in the shadow 
economy, are included in the estimation equation. The basic regression equation for the 
currency demand, proposed by Tanzi (1983), is the following: 
t t t t t t u N Y R Y WS TW M C + + + + + + = ) / ln( ln ) / ln( ) 1 ln( ) / ln( 4 3 2 1 0 2 β β β β β  
with β1>0, β2>0, β3<0, β4>0 where ln denotes natural logarithms. C/M2 is the ratio of cash 
holdings to current and deposit accounts, TW is a weighted average tax rate (to proxy 
changes in the size of the shadow economy), WS/Y is a proportion of wages and salaries in 
national income (to capture changing payment and money holding patterns), R is the interest 
paid on savings deposits (to capture the opportunity cost of holding cash) and Y/N is the per 
capita income.
20 Any “excess” increase in currency, or the amount unexplained by the 
conventional or normal factors is then attributed to the rising tax burden and the other 
reasons leading people to work in the shadow economy. Figures for the size and 
development of the shadow economy can be calculated in a first step by comparing the 
difference between the development of currency when the direct and indirect tax burden and 
government regulation are held at lowest values, and the development of currency with the 
current (higher) burden of taxation and government regulation. Assuming in a second step 
the same income velocity for currency used in the shadow economy as for legal M1 in the 
official economy, the size of the shadow can be computed and compared to the official GDP. 
This is one of the most commonly used approaches. It has been applied to many OECD 
                                            
20 The estimation of such a currency demand equation has been criticized by Thomas (1999) but part 
of this criticism has been considered by the work of Giles (1999a,b) and Bhattacharyya (1999), who 
both use the latest economic techniques.     page 26 out of 39 
countries
21 but has nevertheless been criticized on various grounds.
22 The most commonly 
raised objections to this method are: (1) Not all transactions in the shadow economy are paid 
in cash. Isachsen and Strom (1985) used the survey method to find out that in Norway, in 
1980, roughly 80 % of all transactions in the hidden sector were paid in cash. The size of the 
total shadow economy (including barter) may thus be even larger than previously estimated. 
(2) Most studies consider only one particular factor, the tax burden, as a cause of the 
shadow economy. But others (such as the impact of regulation, taxpayers’ attitudes toward 
the state, tax morality and so on) are not considered, because reliable data for most 
countries is not available. If, as seems likely, these other factors also have an impact on the 
extent of the hidden economy, it might again be higher than reported in most studies.
23 (3) As 
discussed by Garcia (1978), Park (1979) and Feige (1996), increases in currency demand 
deposits are due largely to a slowdown in demand deposits rather than to an increase in 
currency caused by activities in the shadow economy, at least in the case of the United 
States. (4) Blades (1982) and Feige (1986, 1996) criticize Tanzi’s studies on the grounds that 
the US dollar is used as an international currency so that Tanzi should have considered (and 
controlled for) the presence of US dollars, which are used as an international currency and 
held in cash abroad.
24 Frey and Pommerehne (1984) and Thomas (1986, 1992, 1999) claim 
that Tanzi’s parameter estimates are not very stable.
25 (5) Most studies assume the same 
velocity of money in official and shadow economies. As argued by Hill and Kabir (1996) for 
Canada and by Klovland (1984) for the Scandinavian countries, there is considerable 
uncertainty about the velocity of money in the official economy, and the velocity of money in 
the hidden sector is even more difficult to estimate. Without knowledge about the velocity of 
currency in the shadow economy, one has to accept the assumption of an equal money 
                                            
21 See Karmann (1986, 1990), Schneider (1997, 1998a), Johnson et al. (1998a), and Williams and 
Windebank (1995). 
22 See Thomas (1992, 1999), Feige (1986), Pozo (1996), Pedersen (2003) and Ahumada et al. (2004). 
23 One (weak) justification for the only use of the tax variable is that this variable has by far the 
strongest impact on the size of the shadow economy in the studies known to the authors. The only 
exception is the study by Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984) where the variable “tax immorality” has a 
quantitatively larger and statistically stronger influence than the direct tax share in the model 
approach. In the study of Pommerehne and Schneider (1985) for the US, besides various tax 
measures, data for regulation, tax immorality, minimum wage rates are available, the tax variable has 
a dominating influence and contributes roughly 60-70 % to the size of the shadow economy. See also 
Zilberfarb (1986). 
24 Another study by Tanzi (1982, esp. pp. 110-113) explicitely deals with this criticism. A very careful 
investigation of the amount of US dollars used abroad and US currency used in the shadow economy 
and for “classical” crime activities has been undertaken by Rogoff (1998), who concludes that large 
denomination bills are a major driving force for the growth of the shadow economy and classical crime 
activities, due largely to reduced transactions costs. 
25 However in studies for European countries Kirchgässner (1983, 1984) and Schneider (1986) 
conclude that the estimation results for Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are quite robust 
when using the currency demand method. Hill and Kabir (1996) find for Canada that the rise of the 
shadow economy varies with respect to the tax variable used; they conclude “when the theoretically 
best tax rates are selected and a range of plausible velocity values is used, this method estimates 
underground economic growth between 1964 and 1995 at between 3 % and 11 % of GDP.” (p. 1553).     page 27 out of 39 
velocity in both sectors. (6) Ahumada et al. (2004) show that the currency approach together 
with the assumption of equal income velocity of money in the reported and the hidden 
transaction is only correct if the income elasticity is 1. (7) Finally, the assumption of no 
shadow economy in a base year is open to criticism. Relaxing this assumption would again 
imply an upward adjustment of the size of the shadow economy. 
 
Appendix B 
Table 1.1. Description of the variables used in the discussed regression models 
Variable 
name  label 









27 38,122.05 50,830.49 650.3 181,608.1  [2],  [5] 
CD 





3 0.33 0.89  [2], [5], 
o.c. 
GDPPC  real GDP per 
capita in COP  27 1,577,542 194,672.2 1,267,760 1,871,851 [4] 
IRD 
yearly average 
interest rate on 
deposits at 90 
days sight 
27 0.2859259 0.083861 0.09 0.40  [5] 
TY  average net tax 
rate on income  27 0.2455556 0.043175 0.19 0.32  [1] 
TC 
average net tax 
rate on 
consumption 
27 0.1244444 0.021363 0.09 0.17  [1] 
UNEMP  unemployment 














employees in % 
of GDP 
27 0.1181481 0.014945 0.09 0.15  [5] 
GGDPPC 
yearly growth of 
real GDP per 
capita in % 





27 37.57852 43.89995 0.91 133.53  [2] 
                                            
26 Souces: see numbers in listing of empirical sources; o. c. = own calculations NUMBERS ARE 
MISSING!! 










27 1,119.02 1,264.427 25 5,562.22  [6] 
SPC 
average years 
of schooling per 
capita 
27 6.164815 0.810362 4.89 7.57  [5] 
LPA 
participation 
rate on labour 
market 
27 0.5711111 0.037655 0.50 0.62  [3],  [4] 
POP  Colombian total 




in % of nominal 
GDP 
27 0.1092593 0.038323 0.06 0.18  [5] 
SE1A 
size of shadow 
economy in % 
of real GDP 
(estimation 
results model 1 
- var A) 
27 0.39404 0.118398 0.18606 0.62144  o.  c. 
SE1B 
size of shadow 
economy in % 
of real GDP 
(estimation 
results model 1 
- var B) 
27 0.28722 0.142058 0.0969 0.5606  o.  c. 
SE2A 
size of shadow 
economy in % 
of real GDP 
(estimation 
results model 2 
- var A) 
27 0.34918 0.114905 0.18937 0.6012  o.  c. 
SE2B 
size of shadow 
economy in % 
of real GDP 
(estimation 
results model 2 
- var B) 
27 0.29137 0.125021 0.1101 0.56772  o.  c. 
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B.2.  Detailed regression results using the currency demand method 
Table 2.1: Model 1; endogenous variable – ratio of cash holdings to checkable 
deposits 
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Table 2.2: Model 2; endogenous variable – currency demand per capita 




>> Variant 2b (only one overall (additive) tax variable included)  
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All models have been tested for structural continuity, as substantial policy changes in 1991 
(passing of a new constitution, beginning of a more open economic policy with important 
changes in legislation regarding the labour market etc.) might have caused a structural break 
in Colombia. The results of a common Chow test for structural discontinuity are the following: 
 
model  variant  F-value  p-value 
1 a  1.3554575  0.29259339 
1 b  1.7000926  0.18156576 
2 a  1.6145011  0.20611913 
2 b  2.2105135  0.09274099 
 
As the p-values are high enough, it is suspected that the events in 1991 do not influence the 
regression results significantly, therefore the estimations are kept as already presented 
above. 
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B.3. Detailed regression results on the effect of the shadow economy on economic 
growth 
 
Table 3.1: Variant 1: 
(i)based on estimation results for the size of the shadow economy of model 1A 
 
Chow test for structural discontinuity in 1991 (H0: no discontinuity): 
F-value=0. 88371126, p-value=0. 63556824 
 
(ii) based on estimation results for the size of the shadow economy of model 1B 
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Table 3.2: Variant 2:  
(i)based on estimation results for the size of the shadow economy of model 2A 
 
 
Chow test for structural discontinuity in 1991 (H0: no discontinuity): 
F-value= 0.99757368, p-value= 0.59546122 
 
(ii)based on estimation results for the size of the shadow economy of model 2B 
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Table 3.3: Comparison of different simulations on the absolute and relative effect of the 
shadow economy on economic growth 
 
 
Estimations based on: 
SE1A:  size of the shadow economy calculated from results of regression model 1, var. A 
considering all variables included in the model for describing the shadow economy 
SE1B:  size of the shadow economy calculated from results of regression model 1, var. B 
considering all variables included in the model for describing the shadow economy 
SE1A5:  size of the shadow economy calculated from results of regression model 1, var. A only 
considering higly significant variables for describing the shadow economy 
SE1B5:  size of the shadow economy calculated from results of regression model 1, var. B only 
considering higly significant variables for describing the shadow economy 
SE2A:  size of the shadow economy calculated from results of regression model 2, var. A 
considering all variables included in the model for describing the shadow economy 
SE2B:  size of the shadow economy calculated from results of regression model 2, var. A 
considering all variables included in the model for describing the shadow economy 
SE2A5:  size of the shadow economy calculated from results of regression model 2, var. A only 
considering higly significant variables for describing the shadow economy 
SE2B5:  size of the shadow economy calculated from results of regression model 2, var. B only 
considering higly significant variables for describing the shadow economy 
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